The Mexican electoral law of 1996, though less anfractuous than its predecessors, is again inconsistent: it may well be impossible to satisfy its clauses. The basic intents of the pertinent clauses of the Constitution may be met, and the inconsistencies of the law eliminated, by using a 'bi-proportional' method of apportionment. This would not, however, change the overall political outcome: one relatively large party in the presence of several relatively smaller ones would continue to obtain a comfortable and absolute majority. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd Keywords: electoral systems, apportionment, proportional representation, bi-proportional representation
Introducti on
In 1996, the Mexican electoral law was changed again, and so too the several cognate articles of Mexico's Constitution. Happily, the particulars of the numerical 'rules' for transforming votes into seats are clearer and more direct than ever before, though better rules could have been used. But once again, the law is inconsistent and contradicts the requirements that are promulgated in the Constitution.
The aim of this short article is first, to explain the electoral rules and point out where the inconsistencies arise and why the Constitution is violated; and second, to propose an alternative system that responds to what it seems was intended in simple and clear terms, with a rule that is sure to give consistent results.
There has been a lot of optimistic talk about democratic liberalization in Mexico, elections that are fairer, counts that are more accurate, and the like. But something more is needed: an electoral law that is unambiguous and fair, whose arithmetic does not distort the awards in seats beyond what is earned in votes. Otherwise, the gains in the tallying of votes will be lost in the transformation of the votes into seats. We show that a clear, consistent and simple formulation can meet the seeming intentions of the revised system; nonetheless the basic frame-*Author for correspondence. work of the current and past laws gives an almost insurmountable advantage to one big party in the presence of several lesser ones.
Background
In the successive revisions of the pertinent Constitutional articles and the electoral laws since 1977, Mexican voters have cast two ballots to determine the make up of its House of Deputies. Now, and since 1988, these votes elect a House of 500 deputies. One vote goes to a candidate within one of 300 single-member districts, the winner in each being the person with the most votes, and called a 'majority deputy'. Each single-member district is within one of the 31 states or the Federal District (DF), and they are to be apportioned among them according to their populations. The second vote expresses a preference for a party list within one of five 40-member regional districts, with the total vote of each party and each of its lists used to determine the distribution of these 200 'party deputies'.
The presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari witnessed two electoral reforms in which the rules for apportioning the 200 party deputies were modified. The first, in 1989, was decreed in direct response to the results of the elections of 1988. It was replete with logical contradictions including that of assuring (for possible distributions of the votes) to each of two parties an absolute majority in the House of Deputies! Its practical effect was to abet the vote totals with an arithmetic that would give more seats to the one big party Gonzalez, 1996, 1997) .
The second, in 1994--prepared in increasingly tense political times--also suffered from basic logical contradictions. The Constitution called for a proportional distribution of the deputy seats among the states: the law failed to satisfy it. It contained a prescription by which it was possible for one party list to lose seats when more seats were to be shared among all and the relative claims remained the same (the infamous Alabama paradox, see Balinski and Young, 1982) . Its rules implied that a minuscule increase in the votes for one party could result in a huge increase in the number of its seats. It divided Mexico into five supposedly equivalent regional districts in each of which the parties presented lists for the election of 200 deputies by a proportional representation rule--so the promise of 40 seats per region---but the rule for apportioning the seats guaranteed nothing of the kind (in the election of 1994 regions received numbers of seats ranging from 36 to 43). Nevertheless, on the surface it seemed to define a more even handed arithmetic for translating populations and vote totals into distributions of the seats. Yet its effect was obvious (Table 1) : it guaranteed to the one big party--in the presence of about three others, as has been the case in recent elections--between 300 and 315 seats if it managed to obtain at least 45% of the vote, and an absolute majority with as little as 39% of the vote. As for the House of Senators the medicine was even stronger: the four senators of each state and the DF were elected by party lists, the party list of a state having the most votes receiving three seats, the party next in number of votes receiving one Gonzalez, 1996, 1997) .
The electoral system approved by Mexico's Congress on November 14, 1996 is the result of failed, year-long negotiations among the major political parties. Although some measure of agreement was realized on many issues, the question of how and by what formulas the government should finance the campaigns of parties ended the negotiations and blocked any accord. The law is the government's response. A first version of the new law, distributed somewhat earlier and a hodge-podge of complex numerical 'rules' particularly rich in inconsistencies and unresolvable ambiguities, was thankfully discarded in favor of the law that is described below.
Constitutional Changes
The basic outline remains the same as before: the House of Deputies contains 500 members, 300 majority deputies are elected in single-member constituencies with majority votes cast for individual candidates, each constituency within one of the 31 states or the DF; and 200 party deputies are elected by the 'principle of proportional representation', with party votes cast for party lists in five constituencies of 40 members each. The House of Senators contains 128 members, as before, with three (instead of four) from each of the states and the DF, and (an innovation) 32 elected by the 'principle of proportional representation', with votes cast for party lists in one national constituency.
Article 53, which establishes that the 300 majority deputy seats are to be apportioned according to the populations of the states and the DF, is not changed.
Article 54 concerns the apportionment of the 200 party deputies, and is new. To be eligible to receive such seats a party must: (I) present candidates in at least 200 majority races, (II) receive at least 2% of the total of all party votes that are cast (including invalid votes, which has amounted to as much as 3-4% of all votes). The vote total of an eligible party is called its 'votaci6n national emitida' (vne). (III) eligible parties should be assigned numbers of party deputies, 'independent of and in addition to' the number of majority deputies they elect, and that obey the principle of proportional representation with respect to the parties' vne's and the breakdown of the total national vne into each of its five regional lists. (The precise meaning of this clause is not specified.) (IV) in any case, no party may have more than a total of 300 deputies in all. (V) no party can receive in total a percentage of seats of the 500 that exceeds its percentage of the total vne plus 8% (although this does not apply if a party elects a number of majority deputies in excess of this limit). (VI) the seats that remain--after the number of seats to be given to a party to which IV or V applies--are to be distributed to the remaining eligible parties' lists in the five constituencies in direct proportion to their respective 'votacirnes nacionales efectivas' (vnef), a concept that is to be defined in the electoral law. (The first version of the new law concocted a definition of the vnef that made no sense and was at times inapplicable, and led to seriously distorted apportionments of seats. Indeed, it was possible by this law for a party whose vote total decreased by 0.24% to gain over 24% in seats, whereas parties whose vote totals increased lost the corresponding seats!)
Article 56 concerns the House of Senators. In each state and the DF the two (instead of the three) candidates of each party list which receives the greatest number of votes are elected; and the first candidate of the list receiving the second greatest number of votes is elected as well. Each party also files a national list of 32 senators, and these 32 seats are apportioned among the lists according to the principle of proportional representation.
Electoral Law
Articles 11 through 18 of the law define the rules for transforming votes into seats.
Articles 11 and 12 repeat what is stated in the Constitution and establish the general rule that when a number of seats is apportioned to a party list, the persons elected are those at the top of the list.
Article 13 defines numbers that will be used in computing the apportionment of the 200 party deputies. It is easier to refer to the method of apportionment that is used, which is consistently the same (and is that used in the 1994 law). It is the method of largest remainders: given vote totals of each party (or each party list, or whatever numbers that are to determine the proportional shares), compute the exact proportional share of each party, its quota, give to each the whole number contained in its quota, and assign any seats that remain (one per party) to those having the largest remainders. (Although this method seems reasonable it may produce paradoxical results, and is not recommended; Balinski and Young, 1982) .
Article 14 says that the method of largest remainders is to be applied to the total vne's of each party to determine every party's share of the 200 party seats. If a party exceeds a limitation (IV or V of Article 54 of the Constitution) it is assigned the largest number of seats consistent with the limitations, and this number of seats is apportioned among its five regional lists according to the respective regional vne's by the method of largest remainders.
Article 15 concerns how to apportion the remaining seats if a limitation is met in Article 14 and once a party that is limited has been apportioned its seats in each region.
Article 15.1 defines the vnef to be the vne of each of the left-over parties (this definition, a vestige of the first version of the 1996 law, is completely unnecessary), and says that the method of largest remainders is to be applied to their vne's ( = vnef's) to apportion the remaining seats among them. Note that this calculation is based on nationwide data.
Article 15.2 establishes how to distribute the seats to the left-over parties' regional lists. It prescribes that the remaining seats in each region are to be apportioned to each of these parties by the method of largest remainders according to their regional vnef's (or vne's, which is the same number). In this case the calculation is based on regional data and does not take into account the numbers found in 15.1.
It is obvious that it is entirely possible for the sum of the seats assigned to a party by Article 15.2 to be different from those calculated in Article 15.1. This is hardly surprising since the calculations in 15.2 depend on the regional data and ignore the number of seats due each party found in 15.1. The sum of a party's regional vne's is, of course, its national vne, but this does not imply concordance between the results of Articles 15.1 and 15.2. Thus, Article 15 is selfcontradictory, renders the law potentially inapplicable and prevents the result from meeting the constitutional demand of proportionality. For the 1994 election results it happens that the regional apportionments to the parties of Article 15.2 do sum to what each party deserves according to Article 15.1 (and perhaps explains why the fathers of the new law failed to see the potential inconsistency). An example is given in Appendix C whose vne's are similar to the results of 1994 (and that do not alter the vne's of the PRI or the total of the votes in each region) by which the three left-over parties receive 103, 61 and 9 seats, instead of 99, 63 and 11, as they should. Applying the new law to the election results of 1991 and 1988 the leftover parties also receive total numbers of seats not in accord with what they should be apportioned according to 15.1.
Article 16 concerns how to apportion the 200 party deputies if no party violates either of the limitations. It prescribes that the 40 seats in each constituency are to be apportioned among the eligible parties by the method of largest remainders in accord with their respective vne's in the constituency. Once again, it is very likely that the number of seats assigned to a party will not equal its claim as determined by Article 14. So here too, the law may be inapplicable.
Article 17 repeats constitutional requirements, and Article 18 specifies that the 32 senatorial seats are to be assigned to the party lists by the method of largest remainders in accord with the votes of those party lists receiving at least 2% of the total of all of the votes (valid and invalid) cast in the single, nation-wide senatorial constituency.
The Import of the 1996 Law
There are several important differences between the 1994 and the 1996 laws. The change from 3 to 2 in the number of senators allocated to the party receiving the most votes in a state, reduces somewhat--but certainly does not eliminate--the very strong advantage given to the largest party in the election of senators. Nonetheless, although self-contradictory, the new law harbors fewer inconsistencies than that of 1994.
By the 1994 law the seats due to a party by the calculation of Article 15.1 above were apportioned among its regional lists according to their respective vne's (or vnef's), thus guaranteeing that each party received its due. However, the regions had varying numbers of deputies (36, 39, 39, 43 , and 43 seats for the 1994 election results). The 1996 law reverses this: it guarantees that each region has exactly 40 deputies, but at the price of violating the number of seats each party should receive in total.
Both laws ignore certain important numerical problems. No rule is given to determine the number of majority seats apportioned to states. No criteria are given for how the 300 majority districts are to be drawn. No criteria are given for how the 5 regions are to be determined. And both the Constitution and law exude a strong asymmetry--the ever present ghost of one Big Party determines the very structure of the law.
A comparison of the outcomes of different recent elections shows that, as the PRI's share of the vote total fluctuates between 52% and 65% of the vote, the new law smooths the returns to a steady, comfortable variation of between 299 and 300 seats.
Indeed, as long as this mixture of 300 single-member districts plus 200 members elected according to a principle of proportional representation is maintained, with one relatively bigger party (e.g. with 40% of the vne) in the presence of a divided opposition, the result will almost surely guarantee that party an absolute majority; and of course the majority in the Senate will almost surely be assured to the largest party as well. Therefore, the PRI's hold on power will be maintained so long as the opposition parties remain divided. The only way for the PRI to lose is for another party to supplant it as the one Big Party. One concludes that the PRI would pay little to nothing were it to write a simple and clear electoral law readily understood by all, as versus the succession of impossibly confused and obscure electoral systems it has voted into law .... and that have regularly contained contradictory demands.
An Alternative
A law should give a complete, consistent and precise set of instructions to compute who gets how many seats and in which specific districts and constituencies; instructions that satisfy elementary properties of common sense and of equity; instructions that are clear and straightfor- ward enough to permit anyone given a tabulation of the votes to verify the results in seats. Anything less is suspect. It is possible to do this and to meet the basic intents of the 1996 law as described in the Constitution. It is mathematically easy and unambiguous to define a method of apportionment in which one or more parties are constrained to receive a stated minimum number of seats and/or a stated maximum number of seats. The 1996 revisions to the Constitution permit no party to receive a total of more than 300 seats, or more in its percentage of the 500 seats than its percentage of vne plus 8%. (Its first version included a clause assuring that in certain situations every eligible party should be guaranteed at least 5 seats--since eligibility means at least 2% of the votaci6n nacional, and 2% of 500 is 10 seats, the idea is not unreasonable.) Assume that some such desiderata--upper and/or lower limitations--must be met. In the sequel, then, reference will be made to methods with limitations. They are defined in Appendix A.
Artlde 14. Given the number of majority seats won by each party and the vne of each eligible party, determine the minimum and the maximum number of seats to which each is entitled (the 'limitations'). Apply the method of largest remainders (or better, the method of simple rounding) with limitations to determine the number of party deputies to be apportioned to each party.
For the 1994 elections the limitations as stipulated by the Constitution are: PRI with 273 majority deputies, a maximum of 27 party deputies (in total at most 300, or 52.699 + 8% of 500 or 303); PAN with 20 majority deputies a maximum of 155 party deputies (at most 27.007 + 8% of 500 or 175); PRD with 7 party deputies a maximum of 120 (at most 17.514 + 8% of 500 or 127); and PT with no majority deputies at most 53 party deputies (at most 2.780 + 8% of 500). In this case, the methods of largest remainders and simple rounding yield an identical result: The law of 1996 implicitly asks that each party receive its due and explicitly that each region should receive 40 seats: the second aim is guaranteed, not the first. But it is possible to meet both of these requirements. The best method to use is the bi-proportional method of simple rounding (Balinski and Demange, 1989a, b; Balinski and Rachev, 1997) . It is explained in detail in Appendix A.
Article 15. Apply the bi-proportional method of simple rounding to distribute the seats apportioned to each party among its five regional lists on the basis of the party's respective regional vne's so that also the number of seats assigned to each region is precisely 40.
The bi-proportional method of simple rounding assigns seats in accordance with the vne's of each party in each region, in such a way that each party receives the number of seats it deserves (as determined in Article 14) and each region receives the number of seats it must have (namely, 40). The apportionment is the closest possible approximation to proportionality, given the two conditions: whence the name, 'bi-proportional'. This formulation of the law treats every party similarly, eliminating the traditional asymmetry. The result is unambiguous and precise, and there can be no other solution. The results for the 1994 elections are:
Cons. 2 Cons. 3 Cons. 4 Cons. 5  Total  PRI  4  7  6  5  5  27  PAN  20  22  17  23  17  99  PRD  14  8  15  11  16  64  PT  2  3  2  1  2  10   Total  40  40  40  40  40  200 This method always gives unique results that may be checked by anyone with paper, pencil, a hand calculator and an hour or so to do the additions and multiplications carefully (and check them). It is evident that such prescriptions in law would not only meet the necessary standards of clarity and rigor, but would also be much shorter! There is no need for the usual long litany of words and prescriptions: the Articles 14 and 15 formulated above do the entire job.
APPENDIX A Precise Definitions
Suppose h seats are to be distributed among parties in accord with their respective votes. Let Pi be the vote of party i, f~ the minimum number of seats party i must be allocated, and ti the maximum number of seats it may be allocated. The method of largest remainders with limitations is defined as follows (Balinski and Young, 1982) :
Choose a multiplier x>0 so that Z i mid ~,xpl,ti} = h, where si = mid~,xpi,t~} is the middle of the three values inside the brackets. Give the integer part of s~ to party i and assign any left over seats to those parties having the largest remainders (at most 1 per party).
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In fact, the method of largest remainders is a particularly bad method. It is best to use the method of simple rounding with limitations, defined as follows (Balinski and Young, 1982) :
Choose a multiplier x>0 so that El mid ~i, [xpi] ,ti} = h, where ai = mid~, [xpi] ,tA is the middle of the three values inside the brackets, and apportion ai seats to party i.
[z] for any real number z is simply the closest integer to z (e.g. [2.457] = 2 and [4.526] = 5).
The bi-proportional method of simple rounding (see Balinski and Demange, 1989a, b; Balinski and Rachev, 1997) is the result of a mathematical theory that concerns proportionality between tables or matrices instead of between sets of numbers or vectors. Specifically, it is defined as follows:
Suppose p~j is the vote of party i in region j, that party i must be given ri seats in total, and that region j must be given cj seats in total (where of course Y'i ri --]~j cj). It may be shown that the result is unique (for all practical purposes) and is the closest to being a proportional apportionment given the imposed row and column sums.
The bi-proportional method of simple rounding gives the following result for the 1994 elections, r = (r~,r2,r3,r4) = (27,99,64,10), c = (cl,cz,C3,C4,C5) = (40,40,40,40,40) , and p = (p;j) are the vne's. (The values ofp may be found in the next section.) Begin by finding the quotas qij = riPi.~kpi k for each party i in each region j, to obtain a table proportional to p whose rows sum to r. These are given below together with on the margins the row multipliers x and the column multipliers y used to find the next table.
X ----I The total number of the seats received by each party matches the calculation of Article 15.1. This is pure happenstance, as proven by the example that follows. Thus the PAN receives 103 seats, and not 99 as it should; and the PRD and PT are each accorded 2 seats less than they should have. If, instead of Article 15.2, the prescription was to allocate the seats each party should receive among the regional lists by the method of largest remainders (in conformity with the 1994 law), the results would be these:
